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Abstract 
In "Bayesian Economists ... Bayesian Agents I" (BBI), we general­
ized the results on Bayesian learning based on the martingale conver­
gence theorem from the repeated to the sequential framework. In BBI, 
we showed that the variability introduced by the sequential framework 
is sufficient under very mild identifiability conditions to circumvent 
the incomplete learning results that characterize the literature. In 
this paper, we demonstrate that result in the neo-classical single sec­
tor growth model under even weaker identifiability conditions. We 
study the evolution of agent-beliefs in that model and show that, un­
der reasonable conditions, the dependence of the current capital stock 
on the previous capital stock induces enough variability for our com­
plete learning results to become relevant. Not only does complete 
learning take place from the subjective point of view of the agents' 
priors, but it also takes place from the point of view of an objective 
observer (modeling economist) who knows the true structure. 
Please Send Communications to DHSS 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena, CA 
91125. 
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1 Introduction 
The cornerstone of much of contemporary macroeconomics is a behavioral assumption termed 
the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH). Proponents of the REH claim that the hy­
pothesis is a little more than a formalization of the statement that rational economic agents 
do not commit systematic errors, and use all the information available to them optimally in 
arriving at decisions. In practice, however, it has become customary to invoke the REH to 
justify a considerably stronger behavioral assumption: that agents in the economy are aware 
of, and take expectations with respect to, the "true" distribution of the stochastic process 
governing their environment. The question naturally arises whether these assumptions are 
equivalent, at least in a long run sense. In other words, in the context of maximizing agents 
who are at the outset unaware of the true parameters of their environment but learn opti­
mally (in a Bayesian sense), will the agents fully learn the values of the unknown parameters? 
This question has been the focus of intense investigations by economic theorists in recent 
years. 
The standard approach in the optimal learning literature can perhaps be best exemplified 
by the recent paper of Easley and Kiefer (1988). They study a single infinitely lived agent who 
begins with a prior belief on the set of possible parameter values governing the environment. 
It is seen that the agent's optimization/learning problem can be reformulated as a dynamic 
programming problem with beliefs as the state variable. Since the agent cannot expect his 
beliefs to change in any systematic way, it is then possible to show that the stochastic process 
of his beliefs, under any solution to the dynamic programming problem, is a martingale. An 
appeal to the martingale convergence theorem now reveals the existence of limit beliefs to 
which the sequence of beliefs converges almost surely (with respect to the probability measure 
induced on the space of sample paths by the agent's initial prior). A confirmation of the 
REH from the point of view of that literature would now require that that limit be (almost 
surely) degenerate at the true parameter values. For a detailed discussion of this approach, 
and the results so far available, we refer the reader to Easley and Kiefer (1988). Here we will 
rest with the observation that in many examples, full learning does not occur in the limit 
with positive probability, i.e. the two versions of the REH are not reconciled. 
In El-Gama! and Sundaram (1989) [hereafter E-G/S] we question this standard approach 
on two grounds. Firstly, we argue that the non-learning results that characterize the opti­
mal learning literature are largely the artifact of the use of a repeated statistical decision 
framework, with beliefs forming the only link between time periods. We demonstrate that 
in the (economically more realistic context of) presence of a physical link between periods, 
very mild identifiability conditions �uffice to ensure full learning in the limit. Secondly, and 
more importantly, however, we question the use of the martingale convergence theorem to 
demonstrate the existence of limit beliefs for the agent, and argue that the evolution of beliefs 
should be studied from the point of view of an external agent who is informed of the true 
parameter values. The difference is non-trivial as the examples in Freedman (1963,1965) or 
Feldman (1989) illustrate. We refer the reader to E-G/S for details, and a justification, of 
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the alternative approach we propose for a theoretical test of the REH in any given model. 
For purposes of continuity, however, we include a very brief description of our approach here. 
Primarily, our approach rests on the notion that economists cannot have, or impose, in 
their models any restrictions on the prior beliefs of agents. For a confirmation of the REH, 
we would therefore require that agents who are identical except for their initial beliefs should 
have the same limit beliefs (which should moreover put full mass at the true parameter value) 
almost surely with respect to the true stochastic process driving their beliefs. We take as 
our staring point, therefore, a Bayesian economist who is modeling the economic problem in 
question, and hence knows the true parameter value. Our economist, however, knows that 
she has to allow for different possible priors of her modelled agents, and she starts with a 
prior on possible agent priors. The economist prior is assumed to not rule out any agent­
priors as long as they have the true parameter in their support, and thus places full support 
on such agent-priors. No other assumptions are placed on the economist prior, allowing 
for the distribution of mass on agent-priors to reflect any model-specific information that 
the economist may have. Knowledge of the true parameter and the agents' decision rules 
then allows the economist to update her beliefs on agent-priors. This in turn gives rise to a 
Markov process describing the evolution of economist beliefs. 
The conditions required for a confirmation of the REH are now easily stated 
1. The economist beliefs converge to a limit belief.
2. The economist's limit belief should be degenerate.
3. The unique agent-belief in the support of the limiting economist-belief should itself be
degenerate at the true parameter value.
This clearly shows that the REH is a very special case of a much richer class of models 
available to the economist. For instance, if 1 and 2 hold but 3 does not, then the modeling
economist should use the unique agent-belief in the support of her limit belief instead of 
using a RE model. Similarly, if 1 holds but 2 does not, then the economist should study the
dynamics of her model under all the agent-beliefs in the support of her limit-belief, and then 
weigh the results of the models accordingly. It is beyond the scope of this paper, however, 
to demonstrate the more general modeling techniques that our framework suggests. 
In this paper, we illustrate the approach of E-G /S using numerical analysis of a simple 
sequential statistical decision framework. The model we use is the familiar neo-ciasical single 
sector growth model under production uncertainty. The twist we add to this canonical 
model of dynamic economic theory is that the agent solving this optimization problem (the 
metaphorical 'planner' of economic theory) is unaware of the true law of motion for the 
conversion of today's investment into tomorrow's output. The planner begins instead with 
a prior belief on the set of possible production laws of motion, and uses observations to date 
to update her beliefs in a Bayesian manner. As E-G/S show, using a modification of the 
techniques in Easley and Kiefer (1.988), the planner's problem has an optimal investment 
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policy as a function of her current belief and current capital stock. Section 2 will describe 
the model in detail. Section 3 will then describe the numerical techniques that we used to 
analyze the model. The results of the numerical analysis described in section 3 are shown in 
Figures 1 through 10 and they clearly show that the REH is justified in the framework of the 
single sector growth model on the basis that the probability of an agent (the proportion of 
agents) being outside a small neighborhood of the true belief, even though it never becomes 
zero as shown theoretically in E-G /S, tends to zero as time goes to infinity. 
2 The Framework 
2.1 Notation and Definitions 
N.1 For any space X, P(X) denotes the set of all probability measures on X. Convergence 
in P( X) is always with respect to the weak-* topology. 
N.2 Given X, Ox E P(X) will denote the probability measure that puts full mass at the
point x EX. 
2.2 The model 
There is a single good which may be consumed or invested. In each period t of an infinite 
horizon, a planner observes the available stock Yt :'.": 0 of the good and decides on the 
allocation of Yt between consumption c, ::'.'. 0 and investment x, :'.": 0. Consumption of c units
yields instantaneous utility of u( c) = ye. Conversion of investment to output takes one
period, and is the outcome of a stochastic process. Given today's investment of x units, 
tomorrow's output is randomly determined by the conditional density q(.lx). The planner, 
however, does not know the form of q(.I.) but knows only that q(.I.) E {qi(.l.),q2(.I.)} where
and 
{ �(y - yX) if y E [y'X, �y'X] 
qi(ylx) = �(2y'X-y) ifyE[�y'X,2y'X] 
·o otherwise 
( I ) 
{ ):;, if y E [ yX, 2y'X]q2 y X = yX 
• 0 otherwise 
The two conditional densities are seen pictorially in Figures 1 and 2 Observe that for all 
x E iR+, supp.qi(.lx) = supp.q2(.lx) = [y'X,2y'X], and that both qi and q2 have the same
expected output, i.e. J yqi(ylx dy = J yq2(ylx) dy = �y'X. Note also that if x = 0, 
then tomorrow's stock is 0 with probability 1 (no free production), and that for x :'.": 4, 
supp.qi(.lx) C [O, x], i = 1, 2. By the last observation, there is no loss of generality in
restricting attention to initial stocks in Y = [O, 4]. 
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ql (y' Ix) 
Figure 1: The technology ql(.I.) 
q2 (y' lxl 
Figure 2: The technology q2(.I.) 
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The planner begins with a prior p0 E [O, 1], where the prior represents the planner's belief 
that q = q1 (so (1 - p0) is the belief that q = q2). In each period t, the planner updates her 
beliefs, after observing the outcome Yt+l that resulted from the investment Xt of the prior
period, in the usual Bayesian manner: 
(2.1) 
The planner discounts the future utilites by /3 E (0, 1) and wishes to maximize total expected
discounted utility over the infinite horizon (Ea I:�o f3'u(y, - Xt)) given her initial prior Po 
and the initial stock y0• 
As E-G/S demonstrate by extending the techniques of Easley and Kiefer (1988), the
planner's decision problem may be reformulated as a standard dynamic programming prob­
lem with state space S = Y x [O, 1], action space X = Y, feasible action correspon­
dence il>: S -t X defined by il>(y,p) = [O, y], payoff function r: S x X -t ?R defined by
r(y,p,x) = u(y- x) = ,;y=;i, discount factor /3E(0,1), and finally the transition prob­
abilities Q(.ls,x) E P(S) for (s,x) ES x X, where for A a Borel subset of S, 
Q(Als,x) = Pr{(y',p') E Al(y,p,x)} = Pr{(y',B(p,x,y')) E Al(y,p,x)} 
which is easily calculable using (2.1). 
Using standard results, it can ·be shown, under regularity conditions that are clearly 
met, that this dynamic programming problem is well defined. The planner's value function 
V: S -t R+ is a continuous function that satisfies at each s = (y,p) E S the Bellman
optimality equation 
V(s) = max{v')/=X+ f3 j V(s') Q(ds'ls,x)}xE[O,yJ 
s 
(2.2) 
Moreover, the correspondence of maximizers in (2.2) is an upper-hemicontinuous correspon­
dence, and admits a measurable selection g: S -t X. The function g is a stationary optimal 
policy for the planner's problem. 
We assume that all the agents use the same selection g, and that the economist knows 
this selection. The economist is further endowed with the knowledge that q = q2• He starts 
with an initial belief µ0EP([O,1]), where supp.µ0=[O,1]. Let A be a Borel subset of [O, 1], 
and (y,, x, = g(y,, Pt), Yt+t) be the period T capital stock, the period t investment, and the
period t + 1 realization of stock, respectively, and let v0 E P(Y) be the measure describing
the initial distribution of the capital stock. The µ0 x v0 defines an initial measure on S which
evolves as µ, x Vt according to the Markov process defined by the stochastic kernel Q. We
observe the margin on beliefs, µt E P([O, 1]) and it follows
µt+1(A) = j j IA(Yt+1,Xt,Yt,Pt)q2(Yt+1lx1) v,(dy,) µ,(dp,)
[0,1] y
(2.3) 
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The Markov process {µt x Vt}, and especially its margin on belifs {µt} forms the object of
investigation of the numerical analysis described in the next section. To recap the questions 
raised in the introduction, we are essentially interested in the following questions: 
1. Does there exsist a limit economist-beliefµ* such that µt =} µ* a.s.[µo] as t j oo?
2. If yes, is µ* = fip* for some p* E [O, 1]?
3. Finally, if the answer to 2 is also in the affirmative, is p * = O?
It is worthwhile noting at this point that the model specified in this section, despite its 
apparent simplicity, is general enough to demonstrate the effect of the sequential structure 
on the answers to questions 1.-3. above. In BBI, we showed that in Kiefer's (1989) repeated
framework (which also had only two demand curves corresponding to our two technologies
in this model), full learning does not occur and the answers to 2. and 3. above were negative
and the limitµ* in 1. depended on the initial prior on priors µ0. In this paper, by introducing 
a sequential model, and one where we tried to favor non-learning, the answers to 1.-3. are 
all in the affirmative, as our theoretical and heuristic arguments in BBI anticipated. 
3 The numerical analysis 
We proceeded by first solving the dynamic optimization problem, getting numerical solutions 
for the value function V(y,p) and the optimal investment rule x = g(y,p). We then analyze
ensembles of sample paths starting from different initial (y, p) running them through the true 
law of motion q2 and then looking at the distribution of Pt's arising from that process. That 
latter distribution is clearly the sample analog of µt. The rest of this section will discuss the 
details of the procedures that we used to obtain the various components of our model. 
3.1 The value function and the optimal investment function 
To get a numerical solution for the value function, we proceed in the usual way to obtain a 
fixed point of equation (2.2), where now, the transition is defined by 
Q( dy'!p, x) = [p.q1 (y'lx) + (1 - p).q2(Y'lx )]dy' 
the Bayes updating rule is as defined by equation (2.1), and the value function is defined by 
V(y,p) = max{y'y"="X+ !1] V(y',B(p,x,y')) Q(dy'!p,x)}xE[O,yJ 
s 
As usual, it is clear that the associated map T: C(Y x P) -+ C(Y x P) defined by
T[V(y,p)] = max{y'y"="X + !1] V(y',B(p,x,y')) Q(dy'lp,x)}xE[O,y] 
s 
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Figure 3: _The value function - f3 = 0.25 
is a contraction mapping. We use the one-shot maximization solution as our initial guess 
of the value function, i.e. Vo(y, p) = V1f and evaluate it on a 50 x 50 grid of points in
Y x P = [0,4] X [O, l]. We then iterate on the map V,(y,p) = T[V,_1(y,p)] on the grid,
where we evaluate the value of each investment level x on a grid of 100 points on [O, y] and 
choose the maximum such value. The integration for each iteration was carried out by using 
the trapezoidal rule on a grid of 100 points. The functions were sufficiently smooth that 
the experimental use of the significantly more computationally intensive procedure of taking 
multiple grids in the spots where the integrand varies significantly showed that there was 
not enough gain in accuracy to justify the increased CPU time. We continue this iteration 
procedure until the maximum difference over the Y x P grid between two consequetive value
functions is smaller than 0.0005. At each iteration, we keep a matrix representing V(y,p) 
over the grid, and another representing x = g(y,p), the optimal investment level at each
(y,p) corresponding to that value function. When we stop the iterative procedure, these are
our value function and optimal investment function. Figures 3 and 4 show the plots of 
the value function and the optimal investment rule, respectively, for f3 = 0.25 . Figures 5 
and 6 show the same plots for f3 = 0. 75. In the case of f3 = 0.25, it took 7 iterations to 
bring the maximum difference between two consequetive value functions to within 0.0005, 
and in the case of f3 = 0. 75, it took 16 iterations to bring that difference to within 0.0025. 
Each iteration for the computation of the value function and the optimal investment function 
took approximately 5 CPU hours (for a total of 115 CPU hours for the computation shown
in figures 3-6). All computations for this subsections were done using C code on a Sun4. 
The computation of the dynamics for the next sections, and all figures, were done using 
Mathematica on a Sun4. 
El-Gama/ f3 Sundaram, May 28, 1990 ____________________ ,8
opt. 
Figure 4: The optimum investment function - f3 = 0.25 
value 
Figure 5: The value function - f3 = 0. 75 
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Figure 6: The optimum investment function - (3 = 0.75 
3.2 Agent-belief, and economist-belief trajectories 
p 
Now, to study the dynamics of agent and economist-beliefs, we start by drawing 100 agents' 
initial capital stocks and priors at random from Y x P. We chose to sample each agent i's
initial condition uniformly, i.e. (yb, Pb) � (U[O, 4], U[O, 1 ]), i = 1, ... , 100. For each of those
agents, and for each time period t = 0, 1, .. . T, we then go through a procedure of choosing
the agent's optimal level of investment x; = g(yi, pj) by searching over the grid described in
the previous subsection. We then u·se ea.ch a.gent's chosen level of investment x; to draw her
output according to q2(.I.), i.e. y;+1�U[Vxl,2v;IJ. We then use equation (2.1) to find Pt+l
given the already a.vailble values of p,, x,, Yt+i· Figures 7 and 9 show the 100 resulting
trajectories of {p;}, i = 1, ... , 100 from that procedure for (3 = 0.25 and (3 = 0.75 respectively.
Next, we look a.t the histograms of the p:'s at ea.ch t a.s the sample analog ofµ, corresponding
to the initial a.gent prior µ0• The evolution of those economist-priors a.re shown in Figure 8 
for the case with (3 = 0.25 and Figure 10 for the case with (3 = 0. 75. It is clear that the REH 
is justified in this framework due to full asymptotic learning (in the sense that µ, =¢- Op*=O). 
It is also clear that the higher value of 8 led to a. faster rate of learning. 
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Figure 7: 100 trajectories of agent beliefs - (J = 0.25
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Figure 8: Trajectory of economist beliefs - f3 = 0.25 
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Figure 9: 100 trajectories of agent beliefs 
- fJ = 0. 75
pr. o n  pr. 60 
40 
20 
Figure 10: Trajectory of economist beliefs 
- fJ = 0.75
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